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I. INTRODUCTION
Employee complaints of sexual harassment are on the rise. A re-
cent survey of 266 organizations showed that the average number of
complaints per organization rose from .69 in 1995 to 1.47 in 1997.1 Of
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
* Brian S. Kruse, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, B.S.B.A., 1995; University of
Nebraska College of Law, J.D., 2000; Editor-in-Chief, Nebraska Law Review,
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Finds, SHRM / HR NEws ONLiNE (March 15, 1999) <http'/www.shrm.orgt
hrnews/articles/031599a.htm>.
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those complaints, 51% involved an employee accusing a co-worker and
24% involved an employee accusing a supervisor. Additionally, dam-
age awards and settlement costs can cost an organization thousands
of dollars.2 Along with this backdrop, the United States Supreme
Court recently issued a number of opinions regarding sexual
harassment.
In two of those opinions, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton3 and Bur-
lington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,4 the United States Supreme Court
created a new standard for hostile environment sexual harassment
claims. Through the opinions, authored by Justice Souter and Justice
Kennedy, respectively, the Court held that "[an employer is subject to
vicarious liability5 to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee."6 The Court also set out an af-
firmative defense to employer liability and damages when no tangible
employment action 7 is taken. Summarizing the defense, the Court
stated:
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take ad-
vantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the em-
ployer to avoid harm otherwise.8
This Note will examine the impact the Faragher and Burlington
decisions will have on an employer's liability for hostile environment
sexual harassment claims. First, the Note will review the evolution of
sexual harassment law, and discuss the standard the Court over-
turned. The background material will also include a review of the
2. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Servs., 182 F.3d 629 (8th
Cir. 1999) (upholding a $100,000 punitive damage award even though the em-
ployee was not physically injured); Leslie Kaufian, Toxic Employees, NEWSWEEK,
May 4, 1998, at 46 (noting that in 1998 the average sexual harassment settle-
ment in California was $65,000). The United States Supreme Court took up the
issue of employer liability and punitive damages under Title VII during the 1999
term. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2123 (1999) (hold-
ing punitive damages are improper, under a vicarious liability standard, for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where the decisions
are contrary to the employer's "good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII).
3. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
4. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
5. Vicarious liability is "the imposition of liability for the actionable conduct of an-
other, based solely on a relationship between the two persons." BLAcies LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990). Here the relationship is that of employer and
employee.
6. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
7. Examples of tangible employment actions are loss of seniority, wages, or other
quantifiable monetary benefits. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504,
1511 (9th Cir. 1989).
8. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
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facts surrounding Faragher's sexual harassment lawsuit against the
City of Boca Raton. Second, the Note will examine vicarious liability
and the policy reasons for and against it. Next the scope of the affirm-
ative defense, and its effect on innocent employers, will be covered.
Finally, this Note will provide a practical application of the Faragher
and Burlington decisions for employers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law
Historically, courts have not been open-minded to the idea that
sexual harassment violates the anti-discrimination provisions in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 "Sex" was not even included in
the original Civil Rights Act. Its addition was an attempt by certain
members of the House of Representatives to block passage of the Civil
Rights Act.1o Consistent with this congressional antagonism, most
courts ruled that the insertion of "sex" was not intended to cover har-
assment.'" For example, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,12
the Fifth Circuit, in determining the purpose of the "sex" amendment
to Title VII concluded, "it is reasonable to assume, from a reading of
the statute itself, that one of Congress' main goals was to provide
equal access to the job market for both men and women."13 The con-
cept of sexual harassment did not come into the Diaz Court's analysis.
In addition, many courts dismissed sexual harassment lawsuits be-
cause, unless an employer had a policy that authorized discrimina-
tion, it was unfair to hold it liable for acts for which it received no
benefit.
The initial push to recognize that discrimination on the basis of sex
included sexual harassment was made by legal scholars and the me-
dia.14 Over time, courts became more receptive to this idea, especially
when concrete employment benefits were conditioned upon sexual fa-
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998) (It is an "unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin.").
10. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
11. See Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D. Wis.
1979) ("Title VII is directed at acts of employment discrimination and not at indi-
vidual acts of discrimination."); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 235
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that a "reasonably intelligent reading" of Title VII indi-
cates that verbal and physical sexual conduct is not actionable even if done by a
supervisor), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
12. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
13. Id. at 386.
14. See Lx K. LARsON, EMPLOYMENT DIscmMrNATioN § 46.02[1] (2d ed. 1998).
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vors. This ultimately became known as quid pro quo' 5 sexual harass-
ment. Even though Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") guidelines stated that employers are strictly liable for all
supervisory sexual harassment, the courts divided sexual harassment
into two types: quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.' 6 Hostile environment sexual harassment
differs from quid pro quo sexual harassment in that no economic con-
sequence for the employee is involved with the former. Courts contin-
ued to disfavor hostile environment claims even after quid pro quo
was legitimized.' 7
Henson v. City of Dundee'S was the first major decision by a court
of appeals to recognize that sexual harassment claims do not require
an adverse employment consequence. The plaintiff in Henson claimed
that she was subjected to numerous questions about her sex life and
that the Chief of Police for Dundee, Florida had subjected her to sex-
ual vulgarities.' 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held sexual
harassment that created a hostile working environment is "every bit
the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality."20 In its decision, the court, using
the language of Title VII, reasoned that demeaning conduct, "inflicts
disparate treatment upon a member of one sex with respect to terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment."2 i The court also held that to
state a proper claim against an employer, a plaintiff must show the
employer either knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to promptly correct it.22
Four years later, the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson23 agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in
Henson. The Meritor Court concluded, "the language of Title VII is
not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination."24 Consequently,
the Court ruled that hostile environment claims are a form of discrim-
15. Quid pro quo is Latin and means "what for what," or "something for something."
BLAces LAw DIcTIoNARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990). An employer is generally held
strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment, regardless of who does the
harassing, because the harasser is acting within the apparent scope of his author-
ity. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994).
16. See SusAN M. OmLmuN & JEAN P. KAAip, SEx-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 23:06 (1998).
17. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660-61 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding Title VII
is concerned with discriminatory impositions on employment not interpersonal
problems between employees).
18. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
19. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 899.
20. Id. at 902.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 905.
23. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
24. MeNtor, 477 U.S. at 64.
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ination and are actionable under Title VII.25 However, the Court rec-
ognized that a balance had to be struck between simple intra-office
horseplay and serious violations of law. 26 As stated in Henson, in or-
der for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be "sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.'" 27
The Meritor Court also took up the issue of an employer's liability
for sexual harassment claims brought by its employees. Meritor in-
volved Mechelle Vinson, a female bank employee who brought a hos-
tile environment claim against her supervisor and the bank. One
afternoon, Vinson and her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, went to dinner.
During dinner he suggested they go to a nearby hotel to engage in
sexual relations.28 Vinson complied, fearing the loss of her job if she
refused. Taylor, however, never actually indicated that she would lose
her job if she refused. Vinson testified that Taylor repeatedly de-
manded sex, fondled her in front of other employees, and forcibly
raped her on several occasions. 29 Taylor, of course, denied all accusa-
tions.30 The district court dismissed the case because Vinson did not
suffer an "economic consequence," and because she voluntarily en-
gaged in the sexual activity. 31 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia took the opposite position, reversed the district court ruling,
and held the bank strictly liable.32
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the
court of appeals and rejected strict liability for employers.3 3 Although
it refused to issue a definitive rule of law regarding employer liability
for hostile environment claims, it instructed lower courts to look to the
common law of agency for guidance.3 4 Specifically the Court cited
§§ 219-237 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency with general ap-
25. See id. at 73.
26. See id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) ("'Mere utter-
ance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an em-
ployee' would not affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant
degree to violate Title VII.")).
27. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Rogers, 454
F.2d at 238).
28. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 61.
31. See id.
32. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[Wle think employers
must answer for sexual harassment of any subordinate by any supervising supe-
rior."), cert. granted, PSFS Say. Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), and affd,
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
33. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
34. See id. at 72 ("Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an
employer... surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employ-
ees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.").
[Vol. 78:444
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proval.35 This was consistent with EEOC guidelines in effect at the
time, which also incorporated agency law with respect to employer lia-
bility.36 Significantly, the Court also held that employers are not al-
ways automatically liable for the sexually harassing conduct of their
supervisors.3 7 In its holding, the Court also rejected the bank's argu-
ment that the mere existence of a grievance procedure, and the em-
ployee's failure to use it, shielded an employer from liability.3 8 The
Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether or
not Vinson had a legitimate hostile environment claim based on its
newly created rule of law.39
The United States Supreme Court expanded on the definition of a
hostile environment claim in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.4 0 In
Harris, the Court held that whether a working environment is hostile
or abusive is based on both an objective and subjective standard under
the circumstances. 41 Under this test, an employee's psychological well
being is relevant but not dispositive.42 A reasonable employee would
have to believe the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a
sexually hostile environment.43 Moreover, the employee who brings
the lawsuit must also subjectively believe it to be so.44
B. Rejected Standard - "Direct" and I'Indirect" Liability
Most circuit courts did as they were told, but dismissed many hos-
tile environment lawsuits based on traditional agency law. When em-
ployers were found liable it was as a result of what the Eleventh
Circuit called "direct" and "indirect" liability. Under traditional
agency law, liability results when an employee acts as the agent of the
employer. An employee acts as an agent of the employer when he or
she acts within the scope of his or her employment.45 As § 219(2) of
35. See id.
36. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1998) (defining "employer" as "a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person." (emphasis
added)).
37. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
38. See id.
39. See id. Moreover, the Court held that the "voluntary" nature of the sexual activ-
ity is irrelevant. "The gravamen of any sexual harassment is that the alleged
sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'" Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1985)).
40. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
41. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
42. See id. at 23.
43. See id. at 21.
44. See id.
45. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 526 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[Slcope
of employment refers to those acts which are so closely connected with what the
servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they
may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out
19991
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the Restatement (Second) of Agency states, "a master is not liable for
the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employ-
ment."4 6 Exceptions to this rule include instances when (1) the
master intended the conduct; (2) the master had notice of it and was
negligent or reckless in allowing it to occur; or (3) if the servant was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation-
ship.4 7 In any event, it is generally held that because an employee's
sexually harassing conduct does not benefit the employer, when an
employee creates a hostile environment, he or she is acting outside the
scope of his or her employment.4s
Under the third exception above, traditional agency law imposes
liability upon a master for the conduct of his servants when the ser-
vants are aided in accomplishing a tort by the existence of the agency
relationship. 49 The circuit courts had rejected this as a basis for im-
puting liability to an employer in hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims because the agency relation always aids a sexual
harasser.5 0 The phrase "aided by the agency relationship" has been
read narrowly because the agency relation necessarily aids a harasser
if for no other reason than the agency relation brought the harasser
and victim together through a common employment. If they had not
been brought together, the harassment could not have taken place.
Moreover, it has been held that common law did not intend the word
"aided" to be used in such a broad sense.5 1 The circuits held, there-
fore, that a supervisor was "aided" only if the harassment was accom-
plished by an instrumentality of the agency or through conduct
associated with the agency status. 52 As a consequence, employers
the objectives of the employment."); Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th
Cir. 1985) (holding an agent acts within the scope of employment when his con-
duct is authorized or when it serves the purpose of the principal).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997), and rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Andrade v. May-
fair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d
1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 109 (3d
Cir. 1994).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
50. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2269 (1998) (citing Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
51. In a concurring opinion in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), Judge
MacKinnon argues that a supervisor is always aided in accomplishing the tort by
existence of the agency because the agency provides contact with victim. He held
such a reading "argues too much," and the Restatement contemplates a narrower
reading involving use of an instrumentality of the agency. See id. at 996.
52. See, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (suggesting a tele-
graph company could be held liable if a telegraph operator sent a libelous
message because he used an instrumentality of the principal).
[Vol. 78:444
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were usually held liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment, but
rarely held liable in cases of hostile environment discrimination.
A majority of the cases where employers were held liable occurred
as a result of the employer's negligence or recklessness.5 3 Liability
attached when an employer either knew or should have known about
the prohibited conduct, or in other words, when the employer was at
fault.54 Additionally, even if the employer did not have actual knowl-
edge of a hostile environment, knowledge was imputed when an em-
ployee complained to higher management or to an employee with
sufficient supervisory status. 55 Moreover an employer could be
charged with constructive knowledge when the harassment was se-
vere or pervasive enough that the employer should have known of its
existence.5 6
The policy reasons for refusing to hold employers liable without
first proving they were at fault were logical and clearly articulated.
Employers should not be responsible for conduct that they do not sanc-
tion and of which they neither have nor should have knowledge. The
negligence standard applied whether the harassing employee was a
supervisor or coworker because, regardless of who is doing the harass-
ing, the harassment is outside the scope of employment. Moreover, as
the Eleventh Circuit stated in Henson, "[tihe capacity of any person to
create a hostile or offensive environment is not necessarily enhanced
or diminished by any degree of authority which the employer confers
upon that individual."57 Additionally, an employer does not benefit
from a hostile environment in its workplace, and since no instrumen-
tality of the employer is used to accomplish it, no liability attached to
the employer. In addition, courts held if an employee commits an act
that employees are routinely instructed not to do, they are acting
outside the scope of employment.5 8 Hostile environment sexual har-
53. See Bouton, 29 F.3d at 107 ("Courts of appeals that have spoken readily accept
the negligence concept of § 219(2)(b).").
54. See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 437 (1st Cir. 1997);
Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996); Bouton
v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1994); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sulli-
van Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co.,
842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720
(5th Cir. 1986).
55. See, e.g., Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997) ("A plain-
tiff can prove that the employer had knowledge of the harassment by showing
that she complained to higher management.").
56. See id. at 647; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1167 (11th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997), and rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
57. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982). The court went on
to distinguish quid pro quo discrimination because this type of discrimination
relies on the authority given to the supervisor to "hire, fire, discipline, or pro-
mote." Id.
58. See Ottinger v. Shaw's Supermarket, Inc., 635 A.2d 948, 950 (Me. 1993) (holding
that since employer routinely instructed employees not to eat food in the working
1999]
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assment would certainly fit this type of conduct in organizations
where the employer acts cautiously to prevent such conduct.
C. Facts of Faragher
The City of Boca Raton hired Beth Ann Faragher as a lifeguard in
September 1985.59 She worked for the City part-time and during
summers while attending college.60 Faragher's supervisors included
two men, Bill Terry and David Silverman. 6 1 The district court specifi-
cally found that neither of these men was sufficiently situated to con-
stitute higher management of the City.6 2
Faragher alleged, and the district court concluded, that Terry and
Silverman's conduct constituted unwelcome harassment based upon
sex.6 3 The district court found that Terry "exuded an aura of hostil-
ity" and had a "propensity to touch female employees."6 4 Terry's
harassing acts were not confined to Faragher. In one instance, Terry
pressed himself against co-plaintiff Nancy Ewanchew and moved his
hips, simulating the physical act of sex.6 5 Another lifeguard testified
that Terry placed his hand on her thigh, and generally called women
derogatory names. 66 Terry also made insulting and inappropriate
comments to other employees. He once commented to Ewanchew that
Faragher was "male-like because she had no breasts."67 Terry's hos-
tile comments even made their way into interviews. An employee tes-
tified that when she interviewed for a lifeguard position with the City,
Terry asked her if she was going to have sex with the male employees
"like the rest of the female lifeguards" did.6s
David Silverman also contributed to the hostile environment on
the beach during Faragher's employment as a lifeguard.69 The dis-
areas, an employee who dropped a banana peel that was subsequently slipped on
by another was acting outside scope of employment).
59. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1994), affd
in part & rev'd in part, 76 F.3d 1155 (l1th Cir. 1996), reh'g granted & opinion
vacated, 83 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc, 111 F.3d 1530 (lth Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997), and rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
60. See Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1556.
61. See id.
62. See id. An employee is considered "higher management" if as a supervisor, he or
she exercises significant control over hiring, firing, or conditions of employment.
These employees always subject an employer to liability for unlawful employ-
ment practices. See Preston v. Income Producing Management, Inc., 871 F. Supp.
411, 414 (D. Kan. 1994) (citing Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125
(10th Cir. 1993)).
63. See Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1561.
64. Id. at 1556.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1557.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1557.
69. See id. at 1562.
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trict court concluded that Silverman once told Faragher, "If you had
[breasts] I would do you in a minute."70 He also flicked his tongue at
Faragher and Ewanchew to mimic cunnilingus.71 An employee testi-
fied that Silverman commented about her nipples and told her he
wanted to perform oral sex on her.7 2 Another lifeguard testified
similarly73
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that
the Terry and Silverman's conduct towards Faragher and the other
female lifeguards constituted hostile environment sexual harassment,
and was pervasive enough to affect the terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of Faragher's employment.7 4 It also found the City did not have
actual knowledge of Terry and Silverman's harassment.7 5 However, it
still found the City liable because it held that Terry and Silverman
were "agents" of the City. The City was therefore held liable by the
district court regardless of its lack of notice of the harassing conduct.7 6
As an alternative ground for imposing liability, the court held that
Faragher had told Robert Gordon, another supervisor, and "agent" of
the City, about the conduct, and Gordon failed to inform higher man-
agement.7 7 The district court also found that although the City had a
policy against sexual harassment, it completely failed to disseminateit.7s
A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 79 Using
the concepts of direct and indirect liability, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court erred in its application of direct liability.SO The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court held the City directly
liable for the hostile environment. However, the Eleventh Circuit
held that although an employer is always directly liable for quid pro
quo harassment, it is not always directly liable for a hostile environ-
ment.8 1 The court stated that, in reality, employers are rarely directly
liable for a hostile environment.8 2 In this case, the City was not di-
rectly liable because Terry and Silverman were acting outside the
70. Id. at 1557.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1558.
73. See id.
74. See id at 1562.
75. See id. at 1560.
76. See id. at 1564.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1996), reh'ggranted
& opinion vacated, 83 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1996), rehg en banc, 111 F.3d 1530
(11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997), and rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275
(1998).





scope of their employment. As such, they were not acting as the City's
agents when the harassment took place.8 3 The Eleventh Circuit also
held the City was not indirectly liable because the City did not know of
the harassment.8 4 The City was not on constructive notice either be-
cause Terry, Silverman, and Gordon were not legally considered
"higher management."8 5 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected that con-
structive notice arose because it held that the harassing conduct was
not sufficiently pervasive.8 6
The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel decision
and reheard the case.8 7 It virtually agreed with the panel decision,8 8
reversed the district court's ruling, and dismissed Faragher's claim.8 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Faragher's
claim and a Seventh Circuit hostile environment case, Burlington In-
dustries, Inc. v. Ellerth.90 In two 7-2 decisions, the Supreme Court did
away with direct and indirect liability considerations in regard to su-
pervisory employees. Instead, the Court in Faragher held the City vi-
cariously liable for Terry and Silverman's conduct. 91 Under the new
rule set forth in Faragher and Burlington, employers are vicariously
liable for actionable discrimination caused by any supervisor regard-
less of the level of their authority.9 2 However, if no tangible employ-
ment action is taken, an employer may raise an affirmative defense.
An employer must show it took all steps reasonable to prevent and
correct sexual discrimination, and that the employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of those opportunities.9 3
III. ANALYSIS
A. Adopted Standard - Vicarious Liability for Supervisory
Sexual Harassment
In Faragher and Burlington, the United States Supreme Court re-
fused to premise employer liability solely on whether an employer had
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1167.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1167-68.
87. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 438 (1997), and rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
88. However, the court stated that the titles "direct" and "indirect" liability are incor-
rectly reversed in most case law on the subject and in reversing them, "[married]
the common law agency terms to their proper, traditional common law princi-
ples." Id. at 1535 n.4.
89. See id. at 1539.
90. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
91. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998).
92. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
2257, 2270 (1998).
93. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
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or should have had knowledge of the sexual harassment. 94 Moreover,
unlike a majority of the circuit courts, the United States Supreme
Court was willing to expand the common law meaning of "aided by the
agency relationship" to cover hostile environment claims.95 When the
harassing employee is an immediate or higher supervisor, the
Supreme Court eliminated any requirement that the employer be on
actual or constructive notice that the sexual harassment occurred. It
also eliminated the requirement that the employee prove that the em-
ployer was negligent.9 6 Both Faragher and Burlington held that an
employer is vicariously liable for "an actionable hostile environment
created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) au-
thority over the employee." 9 7 The Court also included a quid pro quo
element in the new rule.98 An employer is always vicariously liable
for supervisory harassment when it is coupled with a tangible adverse
employment action.99 If no tangible adverse employment action is
taken, then an affirmative defense is available.' 0 0
In formulating its decision in Faragher and Burlington, the Court
builds on the foundation it laid in Meritor. The Court in both opinions
based liability on the common law of agency.'O' However, in Faragher
and Burlington, the Court expanded traditional agency principles and
the legal meaning of the term "aided by the agency relation." Justice
Souter was more specific and advanced a definition of "aided by the
agency relation" in his opinion in Faragher. Justice Souter stated that
the "aided by the agency relation" may be "the unspoken suggestion of
retaliation by misuse of supervisory authority."10 2 Conversely, Jus-
tice Kennedy in Burlington refused to concretely describe how a su-
pervisor is aided by the agency or employment relationship because he
believes this is a "developing feature of agency law."103
The circuit courts had rejected vicarious liability because hostile
environment sexual harassment is outside the scope of employ-
ment.' 0 4 Harassment serves the purpose of the harasser not the pur-
pose of an employer. However, the new rule adopted in Faragher and
Burlington allows the Court to accept this conclusion. Under the new
94. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2289; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267-68.
95. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
96. See Edwards v. Dep't of Transp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 168, 176 (D. Conn. 1998) (citing
Faragher, 118 S Ct. 2275 and Burlington, 118 S. Ct. 2257).
97. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
98. However, Justice Kennedy in Burlington noted that for the purposes of establish-
ing employer liability the labels "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" are not
controlling. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2271.
99. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
100. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
101. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2285; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
102. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2291 (1998).
103. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Eilerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2269 (1998).
104. See supra Part II.B.
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ruling, an employer is not vicariously liable for a hostile environment
claim because the harassment is now deemed to be inside the scope of
the employment relationship.1 O5 Instead, liability results because of
the aided by the agency relationship.O6 This exception to non-liability
is provided in § 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency and is
separate from the "outside the scope of employment" rule in § 219(1).
In Faragher, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the
district court that the level of hostility to which Faragher was sub-
jected reached an actionable level.O7 Moreover, since Silverman,
Terry, and the City did not take a tangible employment action against
Faragher, the affirmative defense was available.1OS However, the
Court agreed with the district court that the City made no attempt to
disseminate its sexual harassment policy and that it did not keep
track of its supervisor's conduct.' 0 9 The Court also noted that the City
did not create an avenue through which Faragher could complain
without having to go through either Silverman or Terry.lo These ac-
tions and procedures were held highly inappropriate and hopelessly
ineffective.111 As such, the City could not meet the first element of the
affirmative defense, and the decision of the district court was
reinstated.112
B. Vicarious Liability - More Punitive Than Preventive
Title VII is primarily a preventive measure, not a punitive one. 113
However, a vicarious liability standard will work an extremely unfair
and punitive hardship on employers who proactively and cautiously
try to prevent harassment. Under a vicarious liability standard, it
will be easier for employees to win lawsuits regardless of an em-
ployer's fault.114 A faultless employer who in good faith attempts to
105. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2288 (holding that there is no indication that Con-
gress wished courts to consider harassment as being within scope of employ-
ment); Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267 ("The general rule is that sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.").
106. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.






113. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292 (1998); see also Jansen
v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 510 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J., con-
curring) (stating that damages in sexual harassment cases are not primarily for
the purpose of compensating the victim, but to prevent future incidents).
114. See Marianne Lavelle, The New Rules of Sexual Harassment: The Supreme Court
defines what harassment is and who can be held responsible, U.S. NEws & WoRLD
REP., July 6, 1998, at 30.
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prevent sexual harassment in its workplace is still subject to liabil-
ity.115 The EEOC recently made this abundantly clear:
In some circumstances, however, unlawful harassment will occur and harm
will result despite the exercise of requisite legal care by the employer and em-
ployee. For example, if an employee's supervisor directed frequent, egregious
racial epithets at him that caused emotional harm virtually from the outset,
and the employee promptly complained, corrective action by the employer
could prevent further harm but might not correct the actionable harm that the
employee already had suffered. Alternatively, if an employee complained
about harassment before it became severe or pervasive, remedial measures
undertaken by the employer might fail to stop the harassment before it reaches
an actionable level, even if those measures are reasonably calculated to halt it.
In these circumstances, the employer will be liable because the defense re-
quires proof that it exercised reasonable legal care and that the employee un-
reasonably failed to avoid the harm. While a notice-based negligence standard
would absolve the employer of liability, the standard set forth in [Burlington]
and Faragher does not. As the Court explained, vicarious liability sets a
"more stringent standard" for the employer than the "minimum standard" of
negligence theory.1 16
The real question involved in these lawsuits is not whether sexual
harassment should be prevented or stopped. It should. Rather, the
question is whether a proactive, cautious, and innocent employer
should be held liable when it did nothing wrong. One incident of su-
pervisory sexual harassment, if severe enough could subject the em-
ployer to liability,1 17 despite an employer taking aggressive, proactive,
preventative steps.
Part of the Supreme Court's reasoning is that employers have more
contact with supervisors than with regular employees. However, the
Court failed to note that employers do not necessarily have control
over the inherently personal sexual actions and attitudes of any em-
ployee, supervisory or otherwise. Vicarious liability is an especially
hard pill for employers to swallow because the Court in both Faragher
and Burlington conceded that sexual harassment without a tangible
employment action is outside the scope of a supervisor's employ-
ment.l' 8 Sexual harassment is done for the satisfaction of the har-
asser, not for the benefit of the employer. 119 One might well ask if it is
115. Vicarious liability is liability for torts of another even if the one held responsible
did nothing wrong. See BLAcies LAW DicTIoNARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990).
116. EEOC Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful Harassment By
Supervisors, 118 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 915.002, at E-22 (June 21, 1999) (em-
phasis added).
117. The sexually harassing conduct must be severe or pervasive. The frequency of
the discriminatory conduct is just one factor to determine whether harassment
occurred. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (8th Cir.
1998).
118. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2290 (1998) ("[Ilt is better to
reject reliance on misuse of supervisory authority ... as irrelevant to scope-of-
employment analysis.").
119. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2266 (1998).
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justifiable to hold an innocent employer liable for conduct that is unre-
lated to the supervisor's job and inconsistent with the employer's
policy.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Faragher and Burlington cre-
ated a two-tiered system of liability based on the status of the har-
asser.120 The Court's premise is that supervisory harassment is
somehow different than coworker or customer sexual harassment be-
cause of the inherent power supervisors have.1 2 ' The Faragher ma-
jority argued that when a supervisor is involved, a harassed employee
might be too intimidated to report the harassing conduct, fearing re-
taliation.i 2 2 Intimidation arises because supervisors generally have
the power to hire, fire, promote, or increase the pay of an employee.
Conversely, coworkers and customers supposedly have a lesser ability
to exert power.' 23 Applying this rationale, a stricter standard for su-
pervisors seems logical, as employers will naturally have more contact
with and more control over these individuals.
However, this underlying premise is misguided. An employee's
ability to harass coworker is not increased by his or her job status.
Anyone can engage in improper sexual conduct or make improper
statements and advances whether or not they are a supervisor, co-
worker or customer. Furthermore, sexual harassment is no less
demeaning because it comes from someone other than a supervisor.
The harassed employee will no doubt have the same reaction to har-
assment regardless of its source. Moreover, customers and coworkers
can have a great deal of power, or even more power, than a supervisor
has. For example, a single customer may account for a large portion of
an employer's revenues. In certain industries qualified employees
120. See, e.g., Henderson v. Whirlpool Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 n.4 (N.D. Okla.
1998). The Henderson Court stated:
The Court finds that the standard for employer liability enunciated in
Faragher and Burlington Indus. is inapplicable to the instant case since
the alleged sexual harassment is by a coworker .... Accordingly, the
Court will continue to apply the standards previously discussed when
the sexual harassment is perpetrated by a coworker, rather than by a
supervisor.
Id.
121. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291. The EEOC has also specifically categorized
sexual harassment into three classes. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1998). Section
1604.11(c) covers supervisors, § 1604.11(d) covers fellow employees, and
§1604.11(e) covers non-employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998). Generally,
the negligence standard applies to the latter two with a concern over whether the
employer can control the non-employee as well.
122. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291; OMILIA & Kump, supra note 16, § 23:06 (stating
that a supervisor's capacity to create a hostile work environment is enhanced by
the degree of authority conferred on him by the employer and he may rely upon
apparent authority to force an employee to endure a harassing atmosphere for
fear of retaliation).
123. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
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may be difficult to find, especially when the labor market is tight. In
these instances, an employer is not vicariously liable even though the
customer or coworker has a great deal of power over the employer and
its employees. Yet, in these instances, the employer must act negli-
gently to be liable.
The logical question then is, "who is a supervisor"? Lower courts
have found some room to wiggle in defining "supervisor."' 24 In Par-
kins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, Inc.,125 the Seventh Circuit dis-
tinguished between employees who are supervisors merely as a
"function of nomenclature" from those who actually have "supervisory
powers."12 6 A real supervisor has certain essential attributes includ-
ing the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an
employee.12 7 Without some of these attributes, an employee is not a
supervisor for Faragher purposes. 128 In Parkins, two male dispatch-
ers sexually harassed a female construction worker.129 The court held
that although both men occasionally worked as foremen, they were
not "supervisors" for Faragher purposes.130 The court noted that the
men had to answer to a superintendent who held the actual decision
making power. The foremen's authority was so limited that one of the
harassers declared himself a "glorified time keeper."'131 Although the
foremen could recommend discharge of employees, the court noted
that this was not dispositive of whether they were "supervisors" since
any employee could do the same.132 The court stated that since the
foreman had such little authority that complaints to them would be
124. The EEOC's position is that "supervisors" include employees with the authority
to make or recommend tangible employment decisions that affect another em-
ployee or the authority to direct another employee's day to day work activities.
Additionally, the EEOC states that a worker may have no control over the
harassed employee yet still be held to be a supervisor. Such an "unusual" case
may arise where the employee reasonably believes that the harasser is a supervi-
sor, such as where the chain of command in an organization is unclear. See
EEOC Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful Harassment By
Supervisors, 118 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 915.002, at E-22 (June 21, 1999) (em-
phasis added).
125. 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998).
126. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1033 (citing Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 536 n.19 (7th Cir.
1993).
127. See id. at 1033.
128. See id. at 1034. But see Williams v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that where an employer designates a person to whom an employee
may complain, the designee will be treated as a supervisor, and Faragher and
Burlington rules will apply).
129. See id. at 1031.
130. See id. at 1034.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1035.
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futile, they were "clearly not supervisors with immediate or succes-
sively higher authority."133
Another reason why the Court imposed vicarious liability was to
forward a social policy agenda.13 4 However, forwarding a social policy
agenda is not a function of the courts. Moreover, in actively further-
ing its agenda, the Court stripped employers of a substantial, yet fair,
defense to supervisory sexual harassment. There was near unanimity
among the circuit courts that notice and negligence were essential ele-
ments of a prima facie claim for all hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims. 13 5 An employer could successfully defend the first
incidence of sexual harassment if it was unaware the conduct was oc-
curring. If the wrongful conduct had been brought to its attention, an
employer would have had the opportunity to take prompt corrective
action. In effect, employers were given "one free incident" to become
aware of sexual harassment and an opportunity to rid the company of
sexual misconduct in the workplace prior to the extreme remedy of
judicial interference. Upon notification, an employer would obviously
be aware that one of its employees possibly engaged in wrongful con-
duct. The employer would therefore have to take prompt and effective
action or else face liability for future incidents. Failure to do so would
be negligent or reckless. Punitive judicial intervention should only oc-
cur when an employer is negligent or when it is necessary to force
compliance with the provisions of Title VII if the employer refuses to
comply on his own.
The "one free incident" allowance is inherently fair. It does not en-
courage employers to ignore violations and sweep them under the car-
pet. In fact, such a rule has the opposite effect. Since a violation puts
an employer on notice, it has a vested interest in ending the wrongful
conduct by disciplining or terminating the aggressor. Failing to do so
would be negligent or even reckless.13 6 It would also be in an em-
133. Id.
134. "[Flew doctrines of the law are more firmly established or more in harmony with
accepted notions of social policy than that of the liability of the principal without
fault of his own." American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc., v. Hydrolevel Corp.,
456 U.S. 556, 568 (1982) (quoting Gleason v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., 278 U.S.
349, 356 (1929). One should ask if it is the job of the courts to do this. Social
policy questions are largely political questions and should be handled by the leg-
islative branch.
135. See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 437 (1st Cir. 1997);
Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261-62 (4th Cir. 1996); Bou-
ton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1994); Kotcher v. Rosa &
Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714,
720 (5th Cir. 1986).
136. Considering that the most recent Supreme Court decision, Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2123 (1999), holds that an employer will not have
to pay punitive damages for the decisions of its managerial agents where those
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ployer's interest to make any necessary changes in their sexual har-
assment policy after an incident occurred. Moreover, the negligence
standard was flexible enough to recognize that situations often arose
where the harassing behavior was "frequent enough and both common
and continuous." In those cases, an employer was said to have con-
structive notice of the acts. It could not claim lack of noticel 3 7 because
the employer reasonably should have known of the violations because
of the pervasiveness. This promoted employer attention to discovering
and ending workplace harassment.
Under the old standard, employees had an incentive to report sex-
ual harassment even though they may not be able to successfully sue
an employer for damages after the first incidence. First, the employee
has an interest in reporting the harassment because he or she wants it
to end. This fact coupled with a proactive employer's attempts to dis-
seminate a sexual harassment policy and reporting procedure en-
couraged reporting. If after an employee reported sexual harassment
the employer took no action, the employer would be negligent and lia-
ble for the conduct.
Although the new standard gives more power to employees, it does
a disservice to an innocent employer by taking away its opportunity to
remedy a single wrongful situation without judicial interference. As-
sume for example Equal Employer, Inc., a small company with no pre-
vious violations, and covered by Title VII, bends over backwards to
comply with EEOC guidelines. It has a sexual harassment policy, dis-
seminates it, and actively applies it. Further assume that prior to hir-
ing a supervisor, Equal Employer, Inc. scrutinizes the applicants with
a fine toothed comb. Under Faragher and Burlington, Equal Em-
ployer, Inc. can still be liable for supervisory sexual harassment, as-
suming the victimized employee otherwise meets his burden of proof.
Equal Employer is liable though it is without fault. It has taken all
reasonable and available precautions. Such is the sting of vicarious
liability. As seen in the next section of this Note, the affirmative de-
fense may be of no benefit to the employer either. Vicarious liability in
this instance also conflicts with the primary purpose of Title VII to
influence conduct to avoid harm, not to punish bad conduct. 138 As
decisions are contrary to the employer's "good-faith efforts to comply with Title
VII," the employer has an even greater incentive to not turn a blind eye to
harassment.
137. See Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1167 (11th Cir. 1996), reh'ggranted & opinion
vacated, 83 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997), and rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
138. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975) (holding the primary
purpose of Title VII was to influence primary conduct to avoid harm, not to com-
pensate victim); Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 510 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (stating that damages in sexual harassment
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Justice Kennedy stated in Burlington, "Title VII is designed to en-
courage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective griev-
ance mechanisms."13 9 Here, however, the judicial remedy is purely
punitive.
In Jansen v. Packaging Corp.,Z40 Seventh Circuit Chief Justice
Posner advanced a law and economics argument in favor of holding
employers liable only when they are negligent.14' In his concurring
opinion he discussed how sexual harassment differs from other torts
because although a harassed employee may feel its effects, it is largely
"invisible" to the employer.14 2 That is, an employer is likely to recog-
nize when an employee has been physically injured, but a sexually
harassing hostile environment does not leave physical evidence.
Therefore, an employer cannot feasibly control its employees and end
the harassment z43 The employer is not aware harassment is occur-
ring. As such, it is impossible to deter sexual harassment without im-
posing an "unreasonable burden on employers."'144 A negligence
standard achieves deterrence without increasing an employer's pre-
ventive costs to a prohibitive level and without subjecting employees
to continuous and demeaning surveillance procedures.145
Chief Justice Posner also dispelled the argument that supervisors
are aided by the agency relation because of the "unspoken suggestion
of retaliation by misuse of supervisory authority."' 4 6 Since everyone
knows that sexual harassment is illegal, a company with a stern, dis-
seminated and actively enforced policy can virtually eliminate the ap-
parent authority of a harassing supervisor.14 7 In such a situation, no
reasonable employee should fear retaliation. If a company takes these
actions, it has acted as reasonably as it possibly can under the circum-
stances and should not face liability.148
Judge Learned Hand first developed a mathematical metaphor to
quantify negligence.14 9 Judge Hand stated that if B represents the
burden or cost of a precaution, P the probability of loss, and L the
reasonably foreseeable liability, negligence (and therefore liability) oc-
cases are not primarily for the purpose of compensating the victim, but to prevent
future incidents).
139. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
140. 123 F.3d 490, 509 (7th Cir. 1997).
141. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 509 (Posner, C.J., concurring).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 510.
145. See id. at 511.
146. Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 511 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.,
concurring).
147. See id. at 512.
148. See id.
149. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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curs when B<P*L.150 When B>P*L, there is no incentive to take the
"untaken precaution."i5i Likewise, under a strict liability standard,
when B>P*L there is still no incentive to take the "untaken precau-
tion."1 5 2 If an employer takes this precaution, it is liable. If it does
not, it is liable. This creates serious doubts about the preventive abil-
ity of vicarious liability imposed by the Faragher and Burlington deci-
sions because strict liability does not enhance deterrence.
C. Liability Not Automatic - Employer Defenses
To "accommodate" the preventive aim of Title VII, the Court pro-
vided employers with an affirmative defense. In both Faragher and
Burlington, the United States Supreme Court claimed to stop short of
declaring strict or automatic liability for employers. The Court held
liability is not automatic because an employer has an affirmative de-
fense to sexual harassment when no tangible employment action is
taken.i5 3 However, the availability of the affirmative defense does not
achieve this. An affirmative defense does not eliminate the strict na-
ture of liability. Strict liability is imposed in product's liability law-
suits or for unreasonably dangerous activities and there are
affirmative defenses for these torts. Liability under them is no less
strict.
In any event, the defense is available when an employer can prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it acted with reasonable care,
but the employee did not.' 5 4 The defense has two necessary ele-
ments.15 5 The employer must prove:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportu-
nities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 156
150. See id. at 173.
151. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 511 (Posner, C.J., concurring). Posner further noted that
[e]mployers will prefer paying the occasional judgment to incurring costs
that, by definition, exceed the employer's foreseeable liability - by defini-
tion because, were the costs less than the expected liability, the failure to
incur them would be negligence; it is only when they are greater, so that
the employer would not be negligent for failing to incur them, that strict
liability bites.
Id.
152. Strict liability is liability without fault. Similarly vicarious liability is the imposi-
tion of liability on one person for the conduct of another, based solely on their
relationship. They are similar because an employer can be liable for their super-
visor's conduct even if they took all reasonable precautions and were without
fault.
153. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
154. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
155. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
19991
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
In terms of an effect on employers with no history of sexual harass-
ment, the affirmative defense offers protection, but less protection
than a negligence, "one free incident," defense. Its preventative na-
ture is also questionable. Assuming the employer meets the first ele-
ment by acting reasonably, an employer still may not meet the second
element because it is entirely dependent on the conduct of the
harassed employee. For example, assume Victor Victim, an employee
of Equal Employer, Inc., reports, through the proper channels, the
sexually hostile environment created by hisi57 immediate supervisors,
Henry Hostile and Ellen Environment.15 Equal Employer, Inc., hav-
ing no prior notice, takes corrective action. While Equal Employer,
Inc. took reasonable care to prevent and correct the behavior, the sec-
ond prong of the test is not met because Victor Victim took advantage
of Equal Employer's available opportunities. Equal Employer, Inc.
can be held liable in a subsequent lawsuit. Because half of the affirm-
ative defense focuses on the employee's conduct, Title VII's preventive
nature, which is supposed to be expanded because of the affirmative
defense, is frustrated. An employer can be proactive and preventative
and still be subject to liability.
However, if the courts construe the language of the defense
broadly, especially the second element, the affirmative defense could
still provide some protection for employers. Some courts have done
this. In Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp.,159 the court announced that a
"generalized fear of repercussions can never constitute reasonable
grounds for an employee's failure to complain to his or her em-
ployer."160 Jones, a gas station attendant claimed her supervisor in-
tentionally rubbed up against her, directed sexual statements at her,
and on one occasion forcibly kissed her.1 61 Her employer, USA Petro-
leum, had a sexual harassment policy and reporting procedure, and
157. Sexual harassment is not limited to a man harassing a woman. It can be a wo-
man harassing a man or same sex harassment. See Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding same-sex discrimination is
actionable under Title VII). However, the harassment must be because of sex.
The key issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms and conditions of employment that members of another sex are not ex-
posed. See id. at 1002. For this reason the court in Simonton v. Runyon, 50 F.
Supp. 2d 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), held that harassment based on sexual orientation
is not actionable under Title VII because in these instances, the individual is not
harassed because of his or her sex (male or female), but because of his or her
sexual orientation (heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual).
158. The author wishes to thank the producers of the PBS show The Letter People for
teaching him that names can start with the same sounds and be descriptive at
the same time. Note that both Harry and Hostile start with the same sound that
starts Horrible Hair.
159. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
160. Jones, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1386 (citing Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481,
491 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
161. See id. at 1382.
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disseminated it to all employees, including Jones162 The district
court ruled Jones had made a prima facie case of sexual harassment.
However, her lawsuit was dismissed because she failed to report the
harassment fearing repercussions.163 The court, citing Burlington,
noted "failure to use the complaint procedure administered by an em-
ployer 'will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the
second element. '" 164
In an even broader interpretation, the district court in Marsicano
v. American Society of Safety Engineers,165 held that merely reporting
sexual harassment may not constitute taking advantage of preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.166 From the be-
ginning of her employment on January 21, Marsicano suffered what
she claimed were incidents of sexual harassment from her supervisor,
Mr. Hatter. On January 30, Hatter took Marsicano to lunch at a res-
taurant twenty miles from work to "be alone with her." During lunch
Hatter asked Marsicano about her personal life and commented that a
painting depicting a man on top of a woman with her shirt up was an
"interesting position."16 7 As they were leaving, Hatter brought Marsi-
cano's hair out of her coat and caressed her hair and face.168 On Janu-
ary 31, Marsicano followed the employer's procedure and formally
filed a sexual harassment complaint.169 However, the court granted
summary judgment for the employer because on January 30, immedi-
ately before the lunch, a different supervisor asked Marsicano how she
was settling into her new job. In response, Marsicano failed to men-
tion the incidents that occurred during the week.170 The court ruled
this was a corrective opportunity of which Marsicano unreasonably
failed to take advantage. More importantly, however, this was a pre-
ventative opportunity of which she failed to take advantage since most
of the harassing conduct occurred subsequently at the lunch.1 7 3
In Fall v. Indiana University Board of Trustees,17 2 the district
court held that reasonableness was for the fact finder to determine,
and that waiting three months to report harassing conduct was
neither reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of law.173 Therefore,
162. See id. at 1381-82.
163. See id. at 1386.
164. Id.
165. No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998).
166. See id. at *7.
167. Id. at *2.
168. See id. at "3.
169. See id. at *7.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. 12 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
173. See id. at 884; see also Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding that whether employer meets its portion of affirmative defense
also for trier of fact). But see Corcoran v. Shoney's Colonial, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d
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a jury could find it unreasonable. In Fall, the plaintiffs supervisor
grabbed her "like a gorilla" and started kissing her. Moreover, he
forced his tongue into her mouth, and groped her breasts.i74 How-
ever, the plaintiff waited three months to complain through the proper
channels.175 The case was pending as the Faragher and Burlington
decisions were released, and the defendant employer argued it quali-
fied for, and met, the affirmative defense. The court found that the
employer did not meet the first prong of the defense because it had
notice of the conduct.i 7 6 However, the court discussed the second
prong of the affirmative defense anyway. In doing so, it reaffirmed
that in all cases where reasonableness is at issue, it is up to the fact
finder to apply this standard. 7 7 The Fall court refused to grant sum-
mary judgment for the employer, and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court.17
As these cases indicate, the affirmative defense does put some re-
sponsibility on an employee to prevent or correct workplace harass-
ment. As seen in Marsicano, employees are in a unique position to
prevent harassment if they report it. This portion of the Faragher and
Burlington decisions is consistent with the primary objective of Title
VII to prevent harm.' 7 9 The court in Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue' 8 0
commended the Faragher and Burlington decisions for this reason.1 8 1
In its decision, the Fierro court recognized that employers' policies to
combat sexual harassment are useless if an employee fails to make
use of them. "At some point, employees must be required to accept
responsibility for alerting their employers to the possibility of harass-
ment."18 2 In this way, employers are assisted in their preventative
measures.
However, viewed another way, putting the responsibility to take
advantage of opportunities on the employee could also frustrate the
preventative purpose of Title VII. If the "aid" in the "aided in agency
relation" is "the unspoken suggestion of retaliation by misuse of super-
601 (W.D. Va. 1998) (holding that failure to take action until February 1995,
when the harassment started in June 1994, was not unreasonable because it is
not uncommon for harassed employees to ignore harassment when it first starts).
174. See Fall, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
175. See id. at 884.
176. See id. at 883-84.
177. See id. at 884.
178. See id.
179. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (holding the pri-
mary purpose of Title VII was to influence primary conduct to avoid harm, not to
compensate victim).
180. 13 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
181. See Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 492 ("In the Court's view, the Faragher and Burling-




visory authority,"1 3 an employee may be too afraid to take advantage
of opportunities even if the harassing supervisor is taken out of the
reporting process. As indicated earlier, merely waiting too long or not
taking advantage of an opportunity outside of the formal procedural
requirements may be unreasonable and trigger the affirmative
defense.
D. Practical Application for Employers
The practical requirements of the new sexual harassment law are
clear. Employers should implement a proactive, preventative strategy
to combat sexual harassment. To prevent sexual harassment, the
EEOC recommends employers take all possible steps to stigmatize
it.184 At a minimum an employer should have a strong policy against
sexual harassment. 8 5 Although failure to have a policy is not disposi-
tive of meeting the employer's burden to exercise reasonable care, it
still has weight.1 6 Faragher clearly indicates that the anti-harass-
ment policy should be disseminated to all employees.i 8 7 A policy that
is not effectively communicated is useless.
When possible, an employer should condemn harassment in a pub-
lic forum and conduct anti-harassment workshops or training for its
supervisors.'SS Employers clearly have an interest in supervisory
training. Once a supervisor takes tangible employment action against
an employee who has been subjected to a hostile work environment,
the affirmative defense will not be available.i8 9
183. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2291 (1998).
184. "An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disap-
proval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to
raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII and developing
methods to sensitize all concerned." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1998).
185. For an example of an employer's policy that met judicial scrutiny, see Duran v.
Flagstar Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (D. Colo. 1998).
186. See Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998)).
187. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293 (holding City did not meet first prong of the
affirmative defense because their sexual harassment policy was not
disseminated).
188. See, e.g., Fiscus v. Triumph Group Operations, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1240 (D.
Kan. 1998) (holding that even if plaintiffs presented actionable hostile work envi-
ronment claims, the employer satisfied the affirmative defense provided by Bur-
lington since it had a written anti-harassment policy in place, it condemned
harassing behavior in public forum, and it conducted anti-harassment training
for supervisors).
189. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
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The employer should also have policies against discrimination
based on the other protected classes in Title VII.190 Lower courts are
already applying Faragher and Burlington to these classes. For exam-
ple, in Edwards v. Connecticut Department of Transportation,191 the
district court applied the new rule to hostile environment claims
based on race and gender.
Furthermore, any employer's policy should contain a clear com-
plaint procedure. In case the harasser is the supervisor, the complaint
procedure should allow an employee to report harassment without
having to go through their supervisor or any other harassing employee
in a position of power, from the company president on down.192
If and when an incident of sexual harassment occurs, the employer
should promptly and completely investigate the complaint while
maintaining employee confidentiality. Documentation is also critical.
The affirmative defense requires an employer to prove that they took
reasonable steps to prevent and correct the conduct and that the em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of those steps. An em-
ployer that effectively and accurately documents complaints,
investigations, and disciplinary actions will have a better chance to
meet its burden of proof.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment as a tort and body of law has only recently been
given the judicial notice and recognition. The common law has
evolved slowly to ensure proper judicial action is taken. However, the
Faragher and Burlington decisions have ignored this evolution and
rapidly made a dramatic change in sexual discrimination law. The
United States Supreme Court has taken a giant leap without regard
to the effect it will have on the employers involved. While all of the
cases to which this Note refers involve extremely bad conduct by su-
pervisors, the real issue is whether the employer should be held re-
sponsible when they are without fault.
Many of the regulations imposed on business throughout this cen-
tury have been necessary and beneficial. Child labor laws, safe work-
ing conditions, and other regulatory reforms have benefited society as
a whole. The standards imposed on employers in these instances were
190. Title VI's protected classes also include race, religion, color and national origin.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998). Protected classes may differ under state and local
law. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 58-1104 (Reissue 1998) (protecting individuals
based on race, color, religion, sex, disability, marital status and national origin);
CITY OF LINcoL2N NEBRASKA MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.08.040 (1996) (protecting race,
color, religion, sex, disability, national origin, ancestry, and marital status).
191. 18 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Conn. 1998).
192. By now we all are well aware of the type of sexual environment a president can
create. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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all achievable because they did not involve the employer controlling
the conduct of other individuals. However, the current interpretation
of Title VII in Faragher and Burlington will constrict the ability of
businesses to operate while providing only a slight benefit to
employees.
In.imposing vicarious liability on employers for their supervisor's
conduct, the Court is encouraging a costly monitoring system that is
not feasible for many employers to implement. Moreover, the preven-
tive purpose of Title VII has slowly evolved into a penal purpose.
It will be interesting to see how courts apply its rationale to co-
workers and customers. A nonsupervisory employee can be well liked
and trusted by management. If this employee, call him employee A
sexually harasses employee B, employee B may well feel that report-
ingA will lead to retaliation. The same could be said of a large, power-
ful and important customer. Many customers exert a great deal of
influence over employers. The Supreme Court in Faragher and Bur-
lington has taken a step that could lead to a large, complex, multi-
tiered system of liability when a simple negligence standard, applica-
ble to all employees and customers, was appropriate.
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